An accumulator is a succinct aggregate of a set of values where it is possible to issue short membership proofs for each accumulated value. A party in possession of such a membership proof can then demonstrate that the value is included in the set. In this paper, we preset the first lattice-based accumulator scheme that issues compact membership proofs. The security of our scheme is based on the hardness of Short Integer Solution problem.
Introduction
Accumulators: An accumulator scheme (AC) is a cryptographic authentication primitive for optimally verifying set-membership relations. Briefly, given a set S of elements, an AC scheme can compute a short representation Acc(S) of S, called accumulation value, such that for every element x ∈ S a short membership witness w x of "x belonging to S" can be generated. The accumulation value Acc(S) is published, and everybody can obtain it in an authenticated manner. Later, by exhibiting a valid (x, w x ) pair, a prover can convince a verifier that the value x was indeed accumulated into Acc(S). The security of the scheme requires that it be difficult to find a valid value-witness pair (x * , w x * ) such that x * / ∈ S. An accumulator is compact if it yields accumulation values and witnesses that are of constant size (i.e., independent of the number of elements S contains).
Applications: Accumulators have proven to be a very strong mathematical tool with applications in a variety of privacy preserving technologies. Applications of accumulators include efficient time-stamping [BdM93] , anonymous credential systems and group signatures [Nyb96, Ngu05, CKS09] , ring signatures [DKNS04] , redactable signatures [PS14] , sanitizable signatures [CJ10] , P-homomorphic signatures [ABC + 12], and Zerocoin [MGGR] (an extension of the cryptographic currency Bitcoin), etc.
Evaluation: Accumulators were first introduced by Benaloh and de Mare [BdM93] , and were later further studied and extended by Baric and Pfitzmann [BP97] . The security of both constructions was proved under the strong RSA assumption. Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [CL02] augmented the latter work and proposed dynamic accumulators, in which elements can be efficiently added to and removed from the set of accumulated values, as well as privacy-preserving membership proofs. Alternative constructions of dynamic accumulators based on bilinear pairing [Ngu05, DT08, CKS09], Paillier's trapdoor permutation [WWP08] , and vector commitments [CF13] are also known. Li et al. [LLX] introduced universal accumulators that extend the functionality of accumulators by supporting proofs that a given element is not a member of the set that has been accumulated. The security of their proposed instantiation is based on strong RSA assumption. Camacho et al. [CHKO12] and Buldas et al. [BLL00] independently introduced strong universal accumulators (also known as undeniable accumulators), which do not assume the accumulator manager is trusted. Both constructions were proved secure under the assumption that collision-resistant hash functions exists.
Our Contribution
In recent years, there has been rapid development in the use of lattices for constructing rich cryptographic schemes (these include digital signatures [GPV08, Boy10, CHKP12] , identity-based encryption [GPV08] and hierarchical IBE [CHKP12, ABB10] , non-interactive zero knowledge [PV08] , and even a fully homomorphic cryptosystem [Gen09] ). Among other reasons, this is because such schemes have yet to be broken by quantum algorithms, and their security can be based solely on worst-case computational assumptions.
In the spirit of lattice-based cryptography, we present the first compact accumulator scheme from lattices and prove that it is secure based on the hardness of Short Integer Solution (SIS) problem. As the average-case SIS problem was shown to be as hard as certain worst-case lattice problems [Ajt96, MR07, GPV08], our scheme owns provable security under worst-case hardness assumption.
Related Work
Although, there exists no direct lattice-based AC scheme, the constructions in [BdM93, BLL00, CHKO12] give indirect lattice-based instantiations because they only assume collision-resistant hash functions exist. This is true as lattice-based constructions of collision-resistant hash function are known [LM06, PR06] , and therefore the security of the resulting schemes can also be reduced to worst-case assumptions on lattices. However, hash-tree based AC schemes are not compact as, in this setting, witnesses grows logarithmically with the number of elements in S.
Preliminaries
Notation: Let λ ∈ N be the security parameter and 1 λ its unary representation. We use standard asymptotic notation to describe the order of growth of functions. For any positive real valued functions f (n) and g(n) we write f = O(g) if there exists two constants c 1 , c 2 such that
The notationΘ is defined analogously. We denote ω(f (n)) to denote a function that grows faster than c · f (n) for any c > 0. We let poly(n) denote an unspecified function f (n) = O(n c ) for some constant c. A function f (n) is called negligible, often written as
) for any polynomial g = poly(n). A function of n is called overwhelming if it is 1 − negl(n). For a positive integer k, let [k] denote the set {1, . . . , k}. We denote the set of integers modulo q by Z q , and identify it with the set {0, . . . , q −1} in the natural way. Column vectors are name by lower-case bold letters (e.g., b) and matrices by upper-case bold letters (e.g., B). For a matrix S ∈ R m 1 ×m 2 , we call the norm of S as ||S|| = max 1≤i≤m 2 ||s i ||, where ||s i || denotes the 2 -norm (Euclidean norm) of the column vector s i . We letS ∈ R m 1 ×m 2 denotes the matrix whose columnss 1 , . . . ,s m 2 represents the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of the vectors s 1 , . . . , s m 2 taken in the same order. Let ||S|| denote the Gram-Schmidt norm of S.
Lattices
The integers k and m are called the rank and dimension of the lattice, respectively. The sequence of vectors b 1 , . . . , b k is called a lattice basis and it is conveniently represented as a matrix B = [b 1 , . . . , b k ] ∈ R m×k having the basis vectors as columns. Using the matrix notation, (1) can be written in a more compact form as Λ = Λ(B) = {Bc | c ∈ Z k }, where Bc is the usual matrix-vector multiplication. When m = k, the lattice is called full-rank. A lattice Λ is called integer lattice if Λ ⊆ Z m . In this work, every lattice will be a full-rank lattice.
The minimum distance λ 1 (Λ) of a lattice Λ is the length (Euclidean length, i.e., 2 norm, unless otherwise indicated). More generally, the ith successive minimum λ i (Λ) is the smallest radius r such that Λ contains i linearly independent vectors of norm at most r. The following are the two standard worst-case approximation problems on lattices: Shortest Vector Problem (SVP γ ) and Shortest Independent Vector Problem (SIVP γ ) . In both problems, γ = γ(m) is the approximation factor as a function of the lattice-dimension.
Definition 1 (SVP γ ) An input to SVP γ is a basis B of a full-rank m-dimensional lattice. The goal is to output a nonzero lattice vector Bx (with x ∈ Z m \{0}) such that ||Bx|| ≤ γ · ||By|| for any y ∈ Z m \{0}.
Definition 2 (SIVP γ ) An input to SIVP γ is a basis B of a full-rank m-dimensional lattice. The goal is to output a set of m linearly independent lattice vectors Bx 1 , . . . , Bx m ∈ Λ(B) such that max i {||Bx i ||} ≤ γ · λ m (Λ(B)).
q-ary Lattices
In this work we use q-ary lattices; a special family of full-rank integer lattices. A lattice from this family is most naturally specified not by a basis, but instead by a parity check matrix A ∈ Z n×m q for some positive integer n and positive integer modulus q. The associated full rank lattice of dimensional m is defined as:
It is routine to check that Λ ⊥ (A) contains 0 ∈ Z m (thus non-empty) and is closed under subtraction, hence it is a lattice. The hardness of these lattices is most naturally parametrized by n (not m, even though m is the dimension of the lattices) and therefore it is standard to consider the parameters m = m(n) and q = q(n) as functions of n. By taking m = c · n log q for some constant c ≥ 1, it can be shown that with high probability, the minimum distance Proposition 1 (Short Basis Generation) There is a PPT algorithm that, on input a security parameter 1 λ , an odd prime q = poly(λ), and two integers n = Θ(λ) and m ≥ 6n log q, outputs a matrix A ∈ Z n×m q statistically close to uniform, and a basis T A for Λ ⊥ (A) with overwhelming probability such that ||T A || ≤Θ( √ m).
We refer to the algorithm of Proposition 1 by TrapGen(1 λ ).
Primitive Matrix: We say that a matrix A ∈ Z n×m q is primitive if its columns generate all of Z n q , i.e., A·Z m (mod q) = Z n q . It is known that for any fixed constant C > 1 and any m ≥ Cn log q, a uniformly random A ∈ Z n×m q is primitive, except with 2 −Ω (n) = negl(n) probability. Therefore, throughout the paper we implicitly assume that such a uniform A is primitive.
Hardness Assumption
The short integer solution (SIS) problem was first suggested to be hard on average by Ajtai [Ajt96] and later in [MR07] was formalized as follows. The security of our accumulator scheme is based on the hardness of this problem.
Definition 3 (SIS Problem) The small integer solution problem SIS (in the
Clearly, the problem is syntactically equivalent to finding some short nonzero vector in Λ ⊥ (A). For functions q(n), m(n), and β(n), an average-case SIS problem instance is drawn from the probability ensemble over instances (q(n), A, β(n)) where A ∈ Z n×m q is uniformly random. This average-case problem was shown to be as hard as certain worst-case lattice problems, first by Ajtai [Ajt96] , then by Micciancio and Regev [MR07] , and Gentry et al. [GPV08] .
Theorem 1 ( [GPV08]) For any poly-bounded m, any β = poly(n) and for any prime q ≥ β · ω( √ n log n), the average-case SIS q,m,β is as hard as approximating the Shortest Independent Vector Problem (SIVP γ ), among others, in the worst-case to within certain γ = β ·Õ( √ n) factors.
Discrete Gaussian Distribution over Lattices
For any s > 0 the Gaussian function ρ s,c : R m → R centered at c ∈ R m with parameter s is defined as:
For any c ∈ R m , real s > 0, and m-dimensional lattice Λ, define the discrete Gaussian distribution D Λ,s,c over Λ (with center c and Gaussian parameter s) as:
Micciancio and Regev [MR07] proved that the norm ( 2 norm) of vectors sampled from the discrete Gaussian distribution is small with high probability. We preset this result specialized to q-ary lattices.
Lemma 1 Let A ∈ Z n×m q be a primitive matrix, and s be a Gaussian parameter with s ≥ ω( √ log m). Then for m-dimensional full-rank lattice Λ ⊥ (A), and c ∈ R m ,
Gentry et al. [GPV08] proved that, given a basis B for a lattice Λ, one can efficiently sample points in Λ with discrete Gaussian distribution for sufficiently large values of s.
Theorem 2 There is a PPT algorithm that, given a basis B of an m-dimensional lattice Λ, a parameter s ≥ ||B|| · ω( √ log m), and a center c ∈ R m , outputs a sample from a distribution that is statistically close to D Λ,s,c .
We refer to the algorithm of Theorem 2 by SampleD (B, s, c) .
The Gaussian Sampling Algorithm: SampleD(B, s, c)
• Input :
-a basis B of a lattice Λ ⊆ R m , -a positive real parameter s ≥ ||B|| · ω( √ log m), and -a center vector c ∈ R n .
• Output :
-a fresh random lattice vector x ∈ Λ drawn from a distribution statistically close to D Λ,s,c .
We now recall an important lemma from [GPV08] which says that for a vector e, chosen from an appropriate discrete Gaussian distribution over Z m , the vector Ae mod q corresponds to a nearly-uniform element in Z n q .
Lemma 2 Let A ∈ Z n×m q is primitive. Then for any s ≥ ω( √ log m), the distribution of u = Ae mod q ∈ Z n q is statistically close to uniform over Z n q , where e is chosen from D Z m ,s,0 .
Basis Delegation
In [CHKP12] a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm is given to extend a basis of Λ ⊥ (A) to a basis (without any loss of quality) of an arbitrary higher-dimensional extension Λ ⊥ (A||Ā). We refer to this algorithm by BasisDel.
The Basis Delegation Algorithm: BasisDel(T A , A,Ā)
-an arbitrary A ∈ Z n×m q such that A is primitive, -an arbitrary basis T A of Λ ⊥ (A), and -an arbitraryĀ ∈ Z n×m q .
Cryptographic Accumulators
We now give a formal definition of a cryptographic accumulator scheme.
Definition 4 (Accumulator Scheme) Let M, C and W be three sets (the message set, the set containing accumulated values and the set containing witnesses respectively). An accumulator scheme AC is a tuple of PPT algorithms (Setup, Accumulate, WitGen, Verify) with the following functionalities:
• Setup(1 λ ): Given a security parameter λ, it outputs a public key pk and a secret key sk.
The remaining algorithms take pk as an implicit input.
• Accumulate(X): If X ⊆ M then it accumulates all the elements of X into an accumulation value Acc X ∈ C.
• WitGen(X, x, sk): If x ∈ X and X ⊆ M, then it outputs a membership witness w x ∈ W; otherwise it outputs "⊥" denoting Error.
• Verify(x, w x , c): For x ∈ M, w x ∈ W and c ∈ C it outputs either "1" denoting member or "0" denoting Error.
The correctness of an accumulator scheme requires that correctly accumulated values have valid witnesses with overwhelming probability, i.e., for x ∈ M, X ⊆ M, the verification algorithm Verify(x, WitGen(X, x, sk), Accumulate(X)) outputs 1 with overwhelming probability if, x ∈ X.
Definition 5 (One-way Security) An accumulator scheme is one-way secure 2 if, for all polynomial time adversaries A:
If an accumulator satisfies this definition, then it is infeasible for an adversary to prove that a value x was accumulated in a accumulation value c when in fact it was not.
A Compact Accumulator Scheme
In this section we provide our accumulator scheme from lattices. Next, we discuss the correctness of our scheme. The security analysis of our scheme will be given in § 3.2.
The parameters of our scheme involves:
-a security parameter 1 λ ; -integers n and q (a prime) with n = Θ(λ) and q = poly(n); -a dimension m ≥ 6n lg q and a bound
-a message set M = B 1 , . . . , B Q ∈ Z n×m q , where Q = poly(λ) and B i 's are independently chosen with uniform distribution.
The scheme is defined as follows.
• Setup(1 λ ): It uses the algorithm TrapGen(1 λ ) from Proposition 1 to generate (A, T A ), where A ∈ Z n×m q is statistically close to uniform and T A is a short basis of Λ ⊥ (A) with ||T A || ≤ L. The public key pk is set to A, and the secret key sk is set to T A . In the following, the other algorithms take pk = A as an implicit input.
• Accumulate(X ⊂ M): Without loss of generality, suppose X = B 1 , . . . , B Q for some Q ∈ [Q]. It accumulates the Q matrices in the set X into an compact accumulator value
In the literature, the one-way secure accumulators are also known as collision-resistant accumulators.
• WitGen(X, B, sk): Let X = {B 1 , . . . , B Q } for some Q ∈ [Q]. If B / ∈ X, return ⊥. Otherwise, B ∈ X and let B = B j for some j ∈ [Q ]. The witness generation algorithm returns a witness w B to the fact that B has been accumulated in Acc X . It first computes the matrix
This is done, using sk = T A , as follows:
The witness w B is set to w B = d B . See Theorem 2 for a description of SampleD, and § 2.1.4 for BasisDel.
• Verify(B, w B , Acc X ): For an element B ∈ M the verification algorithm proceeds as follows:
If all the checks pass, output 1; otherwise, output 0.
Correctness
It is easy to see by inspection that the accumulator scheme is correct, i.e., the correctly accumulated values have verifying witnesses with overwhelming probability. But for completeness we discuss the correctness of our scheme in detail. Let X = {B 1 , . . . , B Q } ⊆ M, with corresponding accumulation value Acc X = Q i=1 B i . We show that every B ∈ X admits a verifying witness with respect to Acc X . Without loss of generality, let B = B 1 . A valid witness for B 1 is a short vector d B 1 in the lattice Λ ⊥ (F B 1 ) (where The witness generation algorithm has access to a short basis T A of the lattice Λ ⊥ (A). With T A , A, Q i=2 B i as input, the basis delegation algorithm BasisDel of § 2.1.4 constructs a basis
, and therefore we have s ≥ ||T F B 1 || · ω log(m + m ) .
Hence, the sampled vector
, s, 0 constitute a valid witness for the membership of B 1 in X with respect to Acc X .
Security
In the following theorem we now reduce the SIS problem to break the security of our accumulator scheme.
Theorem 3 For parameters λ, n, q, m, m , L, s, and Q, as listed in the scheme, if there is a PPT adversary A that breaks the one-way security of our accumulator scheme, with probability , then there is a PPT algorithm B that solves the SIS q,m,β problem with probability ≥ /3, for some polynomial function β = poly(λ); in particular β = Qs s(m + m ), where s ≥ ω( √ log m) 3 .
Proof: Suppose that there exists such a forger A. We construct a solver B that simulates an attack environment and uses an invalid element-witness pair (A's output) to create its solution for SIS problem. The various operations performed by B are the following.
• Invocation -B is invoked on a random instance (q, A ∈ Z n×m q , β) of SIS problem and asked to submit a solution.
• Simulation -B sets the public key pk of the accumulator scheme to pk = A.
-It then picks Q short random matrices R 1 , . . . , • Breaking One-way Security
• Solving SIS Instance -Verify(B * , w * B , Acc X * ) = 1 means
We now show that e is indeed a valid solution (with probability greater than 2/3), i.e., Ae = 0 mod q, ||e|| ≤ β, and e = 0.
3 To ensure that the SIS instance with norm bound β = Qs s(m + m ) is hard (worst-case to average-case reduction), the modulus q of the scheme should satisfy q > β · w( √ n log n) (See Theorem 1). In particular, for q we choose the smallest prime bigger than λ t for the smallest t such that q > β · ω( √ n log n). Choosing n log n for ω( √ n log n), implies β · ω( √ n log n) = poly(λ), as Q, s , s, m, m , n are all bounded above by a poly(λ) size number.
Next, we show that ||e|| ≤ β. We have e = w * B + R * w * B , where R * = k j=1 R i j − R is a sum of k low norm matrices R i j minus a low norm matrix R (||R i || ≤ s √ m with overwhelming probability). Therefore we have, ||e|| = ||w * B + ( We now complete the proof by showing that e = w * B + R * w * B = 0. Let us assume w * B = 0 (as w * B = 0, w * B = 0 implies w * B = 0 and thus e = 0). As 0 < ||w * B || ≤ s √ m + m << q, there must be at least one coordinate of w * B that is non-zero modulo q. W.l.o.g., let this coordinate be the first one in w * B , and call it z. Let r * 1 be the first column of R * , and let r t1 be the first column of R t for each t in {i 1 , . . . , i k , }. Clearly, r * 1 = k j=1 r i j 1 − r 1 . We focus on r i 1 1 . Let u = zr i 1 1 . Rewrite e as e = zr * 1 + e = u + e such that u depends on r i 1 1 and e does not. Now, the only information about r i 1 1 available to A is contained in the first column of B i 1 = AR i 1 . With even A being known in the worst case, by a simple pigeonhole principle, there are a very large (exponential in m − n) number of admissible and equally likely vectors r i 1 1 , in particular more than 3Q of them, that are compatible with the view of A. At most one such value can result in cancellation of e, for if some u caused all coordination of e to cancel, then every other u would fail to do so. Therefore Pr[e = 0] ≤ 1/3Q. Since A can choose B i 1 among Q possible values (Q = |M|), it follows that A can know the value of u with probability at most 1/3. Hence, Pr[e = 0] ≥ 2/3. Therefore, if A breaks the one-way security of the scheme with probability , then B solves the SIS instance with probability ≥ 2 /3.
